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Abstract—During the past few years, a lot of effort has been 
invested in research and development of eHealth tele-
monitoring systems that will provide many benefits for 
healthcare delivery from the healthcare provider to the 
patient’s home. However, there is a plethora of security 
requirements in eHealth tele-monitoring systems. Data 
integrity of the transferred medical data is one of the most 
important security requirements that should be satisfied in 
these systems, since medical information is extremely sensitive 
information, and even sometimes life threatening information. 
In this paper, we present a data integrity mechanism for 
eHealth tele-monitoring system that operates in a smart home 
environment. Agent technology is applied to achieve data 
integrity with the use of cryptographic smart cards. 
Furthermore, the overall security infrastructure and its various 
components are described. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
OWADAYS, the convergence of information and 
communication technologies has led to the emergence 
of assisted living applications in smart homes. Assisted 
living applications can apply smart home technology to 
provide health care services to persons with special needs, 
such as elderly people or people with chronicle diseases, 
who wish to lead an independent way of life staying at their 
own home with minimum intervention from healthcare 
professionals. In a smart home, health care services can be 
supported by smart in-home eHealth tele-monitoring 
systems which provide remote, non-invasive, real-time and 
continuous monitoring for patients [2]. However, the 
different communication technologies and devices 
incorporated in these systems pose great data integrity 
challenges. The heterogeneous and dynamic nature of smart 
home environment as well as the fact that the transmission 
of medical information between the smart home and the 
health care center is done through Internet are factors that 
raise many data integrity breaches. Data integrity can be 
compromised by malicious attackers who eavesdrop on the 
network traffic and attempt to modify or destroy the contents 
of legitimate messages. Hence, when designing eHealth 
Tele-monitoring systems, it is essential to define and design 
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a data integrity mechanism to provide data integrity 
verification for transferred medical data between the patient 
and the central monitoring station in the health care center. 
In this paper we propose a data integrity mechanism for 
an eHealth tele-monitoring system that operates in a smart 
home and supports transmission of medical data from the 
patient’s home to the health care center. The proposed 
mechanism incorporates agent and smart card technology for 
protection of the transferred medical information from 
accidental or malicious alteration or destruction. Agents 
perform a number of tasks required in order to ensure 
integrity in transferred medical data. Furthermore, agents use 
cryptographic smart cards to provide extensive support for 
implementing state-of-the-art mechanisms for validating 
data integrity [5]. 
Following the introduction, this chapter is organized as 
follows.  In section II, we briefly present the related work of 
techniques for ensuring data integrity in eHealth tele-
monitoring systems.  In section III, we describe the smart in-
home eHealth tele-monitoring system in which we apply our 
proposed data integrity mechanism. Furthermore, the key 
elements of the proposed mechanism are discussed. In 
section IV, the proposed mechanism is described. Finally, 
section V concludes the paper. 
II. RELATED WORK 
The advances in low power wireless communication 
technologies and sensor networks have contributed 
significantly to the emergence of eHealth tele-monitoring 
area [3]. However, there are many security requirements in 
eHealth tele-monitoring systems [2], [3]. Data integrity is 
one of the most important security requirements that should 
be satisfied in such systems since extremely sensitive patient 
information is transferred [1], [4]. In [1], it is discussed that 
during transit of medical information, data integrity 
protection can be ensured using lightweight message 
authentication and integrity check methods such as MACs 
and one-way hash functions. Furthermore, in [6] the local 
computation is proposed to provide privacy to the 
transferred data. In [7], encryption of data is proposed to 
protect sensor data from initial acquisition to final 
destination. Finally, the Cyber Security Industry Alliance 
has proposed data encryption, cryptographic checksums and 
signatures to ensure that transferred medical data have not 
been changed by unauthorized entities [8]. 
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III. PROPOSED DATA INTEGRITY MECHANISM FOR SMART 
IN-HOME E-HEALTH TELE-MONITORING SYSTEM 
Our proposed data integrity mechanism is applied on a 
smart in-home eHealth tele-monitoring system consisting of 
a Body Area Network (BAN), a Wireless Personal Area 
Network (WPAN), a Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) 
and a public communication network (i.e. Internet).  
The BAN is a network placed on patient’s body and 
usually consists of a number of wearable sensors acquiring 
various vital parameters from the patient’s body. 
Additionally, the BAN includes a wearable unit, called Body 
Gateway (BG), which gathers the biomedical data from the 
wearable sensors and transmits them to the base station 
wirelessly via the WPAN. The BG plays the role of the 
bridge between the BAN and the WPAN. 
 The WPAN is a personal wireless network for 
interconnecting the BG with the base station in order to 
transmit the biomedical data through wireless technologies 
to the base station. Typically, a wireless personal area 
network uses technology that permits communication within 
about 10 meters.  
The WLAN is used to connect the base station to the 
Residential Gateway (RG). The RG is located in smart home 
and bridges the internal network of the smart home and the 
outside world. It integrates all the different networking 
technologies that exist in the internal network as well as 
provides access from the internal network to Internet and 
vice versa. The medical data transmitted to the base station 
are forwarded to the RG of the smart home over the WLAN.  
Finally, a public communication network, such as 
Internet, is used to transfer the medical data from the RG to 
the heath care center where the data can be monitored by 
medical professionals, be analyzed by specific algorithms or 
be stored in databases.  
The network infrastructure of the smart in-home eHealth 
tele-monitoring system is shown in the following Fig. 1: 
 
 
Fig. 1 Smart In-Home eHealth Tele-monitoring System 
 
In our proposed data integrity mechanism, agents are 
hosted in the BG, the RG and the PC in the health care 
center. The BG hosts an agent devoted to receive and 
transmit messages as well as make use of cryptographic 
primitives. An agent is also located in the RG for receiving 
and sending messages as well as using cryptographic 
primitives and executing an encryption process. Finally, the 
PC of the healthcare professional hosts an agent for 
receiving messages, using cryptographic primitives and 
executing a decryption process. The agents in the RG and 
the PC of the caregiver execute the functions of the 
cryptographic primitives and the encryption/decryption 
processes on the cryptographic smart cards connected to the 
RG and the PC. Each smart card stores a pair of secret keys. 
The one, called km, is for the cryptographic primitives used 
in the RG and the PC and the other, called ke, is for the 
encryption process used in the RG and decryption process 
used in the PC. As cryptographic primitives, we use a 
distinct category of keyed hash functions, called Message 
Authentication Codes (MACs). MAC algorithms and 
encryption/decryption algorithms are stored on the smart 
cards. Furthermore, we consider that the MAC-address of 
each sensor is known a priori to the BG, the RG and the PC 
in the health care center. Also, the MAC-address of the BG 
is known a priori to the RG and the PC in the heath care 
center. Moreover, we suppose that there is a secret pre-
shared key, called master key, known a priori to each sensor, 
the BG, the RG and the PC in the health care center.  Thus, 
we assume that the secret MAC key of each sensor is 
generated by the following formula: 
 
KeyMasteraddressMACsensorkeysensor ____ ⊕=  (1) 
 
Additionally, the secret MAC key of the BG is given by 
the following formula: 
 
KeyMasteraddressMACBGkeyBG ____ ⊕=  (2) 
 
The architecture of our proposed data integrity mechanism 
is shown in the following Fig.2: 
 
 
Fig. 2 Proposed Data Integrity Mechanism Architecture 
IV. OPERATION OF THE PROPOSED DATA INTEGRITY 
MECHANISM 
In our proposed data integrity mechanism, we take into 
consideration two scenarios. In the first one, biomedical data 
are transferred from a sensor to the PC in the health care 
center. The first scenario includes four processes. In the 
second one, a notification message is transferred from the 
BG or the RG to the health care center. 
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A. Scenario A 
1) Process 1 
Each time that a sensor is going to send biomedical data, 
x, to the BG, the sensor firstly computes a MAC, 
Hsensor_key(x), over the biomedical data, x, using its secret 
MAC key. Then, the sensor sends a message including both 
the current biomedical data, x, and its corresponding MAC, 
Hsensor_key(x), to the BG. 
 
2) Process 2 
The agent of the BG, upon receiving the message, 
separates the received MAC, Hsensor_key(x), from the received 
biomedical data, x, and independently computes a MAC 
over the received biomedical data using the secret MAC key 
of the sensor. Then, the agent compares the computed MAC 
to the received MAC and if they match, it means that the 
transferred data have not been altered during the 
transmission from the sensor to the BG.  
Following that, the agent computes the MAC, HBG_key(x), 
over the received biomedical data, x, using the secret MAC 
key of the BG. Then, the agent sends a message including 
both the received biomedical data, x, and its corresponding 
computed MAC, HBG_key(x), to the base station, which 
forwards the message to the RG. 
 
3) Process 3 
In the RG, the located agent receives the message from 
the base station and separates the received MAC, HBG_key(x), 
from the received biomedical data, x, and independently 
computes a MAC over the biomedical data using the secret 
MAC key of the BG . The computation of the MAC is 
executed on the smart card where the MAC algorithm is 
stored. The agent sends the received biomedical data, x, and 
the secret MAC key of the BG to the smart card where the 
MAC algorithm is executed and the computed MAC is sent 
back to the agent that compares it to the received MAC. In 
case that they match, it means that the transferred data have 
not been altered during the transmission from the BG to RG. 
Then, the agent of the RG uses the smart card to create the 
message that should be sent to the health care center. Firstly, 
in the smart card, the agent computes the MAC, Hkm(x), over 
the received biomedical data, x, using the secret key, km, as 
the secret MAC key. Then, the new computed MAC, Hkm(x), 
is sent back to the agent. In the next step, the agent encrypts 
the received biomedical data, x. The encryption takes place 
on the smart card using the encryption algorithm (e.g. AES) 
and the secret key, ke. The encrypted biomedical data, Eke(x), 
are sent back to the agent. The agent sends the encrypted 
biomedical data, Eke(x), and the MAC, Hkm(x), to the PC of 
the caregiver. The block diagram of Process 3 is depicted in 




Fig. 3  Process 3 Block Diagram 
 
4) Process 4 
In the healthcare center, the PC of the caregiver hosts a 
local agent and is equipped with the smart card that stores 
the secret keys, km and ke, as well as the MAC and 
decryption algorithms stored on the RG’s smart card. The 
agent receives the message from the RG and separates the 
received MAC, Hkm(x), from the received encrypted 
biomedical data, Eke(x) and sends them to the smart card 
where they are decrypted using the secret key, ke. Then, the 
agent computes a MAC over the decrypted data using the 
secret key, km, as the secret MAC key. The computation of 
the MAC is executed on the smart card. Then, the computed 
MAC is sent back to the agent that compares it to the 
received MAC. In case that they match, it means that the 
transferred biomedical data have not been tampered during 
the transmission from the RG to the health care center. 
 
B. Scenario B 
In this scenario, a notification message is transferred from 
the BG or the RG to the health care center in case that the 
BG or RG detects that the received data have been changed 
by unauthorized parties. The notification message includes 
an alarm code known to the other nodes as well as a MAC 
computing over the alarm code using the secret MAC key of 
the node whose data have been tampered. This MAC will be 
used by the PC’s agent to identify the node whose data have 
been changed. 
In case that the BG’s agent detects that the received 
message from a sensor has been changed, the agent sends a 
notification message (notif_msg) to the RG. The notification 
message includes the alarm code and a MAC, 
Hsensor_key(alarm_code), computing over the alarm code using 
the secret MAC key of the sensor, whose data have been 
tampered. Then, the agent computes another MAC, 
HBG_key(notif_msg), over the notification message using the 
secret MAC key of the BG and sends a message including 
both the notification message and its corresponding MAC, 
HBG_key(notif_msg), to the base station. The base station 
forwards the received message to the RG. The above 
processes, that agent performs, are presented in the 






Fig. 4 Processes performed by the agent located in the BG 
 
In the RG, the local agent receives the message from the 
base station and separates the received MAC, 
HBG_key(notif_msg), from the received notification message 
and computes a MAC over the notification message using 
the secret MAC key of the BG. Thus, the agent sends the 
received notification message and the secret MAC key of the 
BG to the smart card where the MAC algorithm is executed 
and the computed MAC is sent back to the agent that 
compares it to the received MAC. In case that they match, 
the agent computes a MAC, Hkm(notif_msg), over the 
notification message using the secret key, km, as the secret 
MAC key. Then, the agent sends a message including the 
notification message from the BG as well as its 
corresponding MAC, Hkm(notif_msg), to the PC in the health 
care center. 
In the health care center, the local agent hosted in the 
caregiver’s PC receives the message from the RG and 
separates the received MAC, Hkm(notif_msg), from the 
received notification message and sends it to the smart card 
where the agent computes a MAC over the notification 
message using the secret key, km, as the secret MAC key. 
The computation of the MAC is executed on the smart card 
where the MAC algorithm is stored and the computed MAC 
is sent back to the agent that compares it to the received 
MAC. In case that they match, the agent separates the alarm 
code from the MAC of the sensor, Hsensor_key(alarm_code). 
Then, the agent computes MACs over the alarm code using 
all the known secret MAC keys of the sensors. When a 
MAC is computed, it is compared to the MAC, 
Hsensor_key(alarm_code), included in the notification message. 
When the computed MAC is equal to the 
Hsensor_key(alarm_code), it means that the agent has identified 
the sensor whose data have been changed as the agent has 
identified its unique secret MAC key. 
In case that the agent hosted in RG detects that the 
received message from the BG has been changed, the agent 
sends a notification message to the PC. The notification 
message includes the alarm code and the MAC, 
HBG_key(alarm_code), computing over the alarm code using 
the secret MAC key of the BG. Thus, the agent sends the 
alarm code and the secret MAC key of the BG to the smart 
card where the MAC algorithm is executed and the 
computed MAC is sent back to the agent that creates the 
notification message. Then, the agent sends the notification 
message to the smart card where the agents computes the 
MAC, Hkm(notif_msg), over the notification message using 
the secret key, km, as the secret MAC key. Then, the agent 
sends a message including the notification message and its 
corresponding MAC, Hkm(notif_msg), to the PC in the 
healthcare center. There, the local agent performs the same 
processes as in the previous case to identify that the BG is 
the node whose data have been changed. 
V. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we have proposed a data integrity 
mechanism for eHealth Tele-monitoring system that 
operates in smart homes. In the proposed data integrity 
mechanism, agent technology is suggested to achieve data 
integrity for the transferred medical data making use of 
cryptographic smart cards and MACs. The main advantage 
regarding the use of agents is that they perform all required 
cryptographic processes as well as exchange the sensitive 
medical information from the patient to the health care 
center over a heterogeneous and insecure network without 
any user interference. Furthermore, MACs are proposed 
since they are energy efficient secure cryptographic 
primitives that conserve resources of the sensor nodes. 
In our proposed mechanism, we have assumed that the 
length of the MAC value is n bits. Thus, in both scenarios 
the overhead is n bits. Additionally, in both scenarios the 
computational complexity is O(2n/2), considering the 
birthday attack.  
Finally, we are in the process of studying the behavior of 
the proposed data integrity mechanism by simulating our 
model into the OPNET modeling tool.  
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